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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of corruption on tax compliance using a sample of 700 small business in 
Bamako, Mali. Our results show that paying bribes reduced tax compliance by almost ten percentage 
points. 
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1. Introduction 
This study aims to measure the impact of corruption on tax compliance by small retailers in Bamako 
(Mali), controlling for possible confounding factors and mismeasurement. Rates of (direct) tax 
mobilization are known to be particularly low in Sub-Saharan Africa (Abramovsky et al 2014; Gordon and 
Li 2009), and much lower in the informal sector (Joshi et al 2014), which is the focus of our study. 
Corruption negatively influences the tax payment through two channels. First, some individuals or firms 
can pay bribes to reduce or avoid tax payment. Bribes are viewed as a substitute for tax payments. 
Second, fiscal contract theories (cf Andreoni et al 1998; Timmons and Garfias 2015) posit that tax yields 
depend on agents’ willingness to accept them. Consequently, generalized corruption for public service 
procurement reduces the willingness to accept tax payment.   
In addition to cross-country studies using perception indicators of corruption or tax morale (e.g., Torgler 
2005; Richardson 2009; Attila et al. 2009; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010), econometric studies at the 
firm level are scarce. Alm et al (2016); and Gauthier and Goyette (2014) obtained the negative impact of 
corruption on tax compliance using extensive firm surveys of the World Bank. However, these studies are 
based on relatively large and formal firms. For instance, in the sample of Ugandan firms used by Gauthier 
and Goyette (2014), the average number of employees is 124. By contrast, our work contributes to this 
burgeoning literature by relying on the results of an original survey focusing on 700 micro enterprises, 
essentially informal or semi-formal, in the retail sector of a huge and poor African city. We show that 
corruption always deters tax payments, and these results are robust to various tax compliance indicators 
after controlling for the potential endogeneity of corruption. 
2. Data and variables  
The survey: Data were retrieved from face-to-face interviews conducted with 700 micro retailers in 
Bamako in October and November 2016. Our sample includes a large proportion of informal or semi-
formal micro enterprises, which by definition cannot be drawn at random from an official list of retailers 
registered in the Malian statistical office. Following the “Intercept point survey” method (McKenzie and 
Mistiaen, 2009), our sampling scheme attempts to respect the geographical and sectoral concentrations 
of retail activities in Bamako.  
Dependent variable: Our main indicator representing tax compliance is a binary measure, signaling the 
payment of direct taxes. In Mali, the normal rate of corporate income tax is 30% but small firms are 
subject to a “synthetic tax” based on turnover (Rota-Graziosi et al. 2014).  Our survey also provides 
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information on the amounts of tax payments, but we casted serious doubts about the accuracy of these 
amounts. As an additional measure of tax compliance, we relied an indicator based on the registration of 
the retailer with the tax authority (Tax_regist).  
Independent variables: The payment of bribes, declared by survey respondents, is our main explanatory 
variable of interest. It is worth mentioning that we had a response rate of 89.3 per-cent (possibly 
excluding selection bias), of which 13 per-cent declared that they have paid bribes in the past.  
Drawing on literature regarding the drivers of formality and taxation, we include the following individual-
level variables (chiefs of retail unit): Female, with value 1 indicating that the retailer is a woman and 0 for 
a man; Age, continuous variable; Educ_Second for interviewees that attended high school or university; 
Close_to_admin Existence of a close family member in public administration. Further, we included 
business-level characteristics: the firm size (Size) variable is measured as the logarithm of the firm’s 
turnover; Employment represents the total number of employees; Other_activities, is a binary variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the retailer developed other activities; Multi_activities, takes a value of 1 if the 
retailer manages several businesses; Tax_audit is a dummy variable taking value a value of 1 if the 
retailer has experienced a tax audit during the recent past; Fixed_premises is a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 for if the business is located in fixed business premises and 0 otherwise; and Industry effects 
are the retail sub-sector dummy variables: food, textiles, electrical products, various equipment, multiple 
products and others.  
3. Empirical Methodology 
To measure the impact of corruption on the propensity to pay corporate taxes, we use the following 
specification: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1)  = Φ(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽) , 
where i denotes the retailer, and X is a vector of covariates (as listed in section 2), including our measure 
of corruption. Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we rely on a probit model to estimate 
the 𝛽𝛽 parameters, and hence, Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. 
As the tax payment and the corruption data are based on self-reporting, we faced a serious issue of over-
or understatement of the actual values. While the former introduces noise in our estimates, the latter 
may bias our results. We address tackle in the following manner: first, as an alternative to the “tax 
payment” variable, we use the information on registration at the tax administration to proxy the fact of 
paying taxes. Second, we instrument the corruption variable (i.e., declared active corruption by the 
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survey respondent) with a variable of corruption perception (i.e. does the survey respondent consider 
corruption to be more important in her sector than in others). Both corruption variables were 
significantly correlated (0.41***), and take the same value in 85 per cent of the cases.  
4. Results 
Table 1 displays the determinants of tax compliance. In columns (1) to (3), we focus on our preferred 
measure of tax compliance based on tax payment. In the first column, we report the marginal effects of 
simple probit estimations for the whole sample (appropriately adjusted in case of binary explanatory 
variables). Our results highlight that corruption has a negative and statistically significant effect on tax 
compliance. The same result holds in column (2), when we restrict our sample to observations that are 
also available for our instrument. The results remain unchanged. 
To control for endogeneity, we instrument our corruption variable as explained in the previous section. 
The results are displayed in column (3). The F-value of the first stage reported at the bottom of the table 
dispels the weak instrument eventuality. We confirm that corruption has a negative and significant 
impact on tax compliance. Corruption is not only statistically significant but also economically sizeable. 
On average, two thirds of the surveyed retailers comply with tax payment in our sample. However, 
paying bribes reduced this ratio by 20 percentage points.  
In columns (4) to (6), we provide a robustness check by employing an alternative dependent variable for 
tax payment. As mentioned in the previous section, registration with the tax authority is not perfectly 
correlated with tax payment. Almost one quarter of firms that are registered with the tax authority do 
not pay taxes (the opposite occurs as well but is rarer). The results with our alternative indicator of tax 
compliance confirm our main findings. Corruption is negatively associated with tax compliance. The 
economic impact is also far from negligible. While 85 per cent of the firms are registered with tax 
authorities, paying bribes reduced this likelihood by almost ten percentage points.  
Finally, we observe that control variables are often in line with predictions. In particular, larger firms, 
fixed businesses and those that experienced a tax audit are more likely to comply.   
5. Conclusion  
Our study investigates the determinants of tax compliance of micro-enterprises in Africa using a survey 
of 700 retailers in Bamako, Mali. Two major conclusions can be drawn. First, contrary to a common 
belief, a significant number of small firms pay taxes. Second, corruption provides a way to avoid 
complying with tax requirements or is considered as a substitute thereof.  
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Table 1: Determinants of tax compliance  
 Tax payment  Tax authority registration 
  probit probit IV-probit   probit probit IV-probit 
 
All Rest. Rest. 
 
All Rest. Rest. 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Corruption -0.1653*** -0.1672*** -0.2012*** -0.0663* -0.0837** -0.0485*** 
 
(-3.45) (-3.37) (-3.28) 
 
(-1.75) (-2.01) (-2.66) 
Age 0.0056*** 0.0042** 0.0061* 
 
0.0015 0.0002 0.0003 
 
(2.98) (1.96) (1.85) 
 
(1.13) (0.17) (0.22) 
Educ_Second -0.0437 -0.0726 -0.0874 
 
0.0058 -0.0324 -0.0166 
 
(-1.11) (-1.55) (-1.39) 
 
(0.21) (-1.01) (-0.89) 
Female -0.0632 -0.0262 -0.0528 
 
-0.0592* -0.0385 -0.0344 
 
(-1.34) (-0.46) (-0.22) 
 
(-1.85) (-1.16) (-1.17) 
Close_to_admin 0.0755** 0.0282 0.0404 
 
-0.0204 0.0100 0.0061 
 
(2.08) (0.70) (0.72) 
 
(-0.89) (0.39) (0.42) 
Size 0.0650*** 0.0477*** 0.0731* 
 
0.0330*** 0.0182 0.0124 
 
(4.24) (2.57) (1.78) 
 
(2.93) (1.43) (0.66) 
Employment 0.0029 0.0028 0.0434 
 
0.0117 0.0153 0.0083* 
 
(0.35) (0.31) (0.15) 
 
(1.27) (1.46) (1.90) 
Other_activities 0.0349 0.0508 0.0825 
 
0.0055 0.0067 0.0057 
 
(0.94) (1.17) (0.98) 
 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.04) 
Multi_activities -0.1635*** -0.1003** -0.1653** 0.0881*** 0.0792** 0.0443* 
 
(-3.77) (-2.04) (-1.96) 
 
(2.56) (2.17) (1.94) 
Tax_audit 0.0997** 0.2759*** 0.3845*** 0.0896*** 0.0654* 0.0640** 
 
(2.37) (3.95) (4.53) 
 
(2.98) (1.67) (2.45) 
Fixed_premises 0.2582*** 0.1904** 0.4989* 
 
0.3051*** 0.03894*** 0.3715*** 
 
(3.77) (2.26) (1.64) 
 
(4.77) (4.12) (3.30) 
Industry 
dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. 
 
Incl. Incl. Incl. 
        Obs.  548 388 388 
 
552 343 343 
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.36 - 
 
0.56 0.60 - 
F-1st (excl. IV) 
 
49.14 
   
39.44 
Wald-test     3.25*       2.03 
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if a firm pays a direct tax in columns (1) to (3); and, a dummy equals to one 
if a firm is registered with tax authority in columns (4) to (6). Table reports marginal effects and associated z-score in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.  
 
